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Theories and Heuristics: How Best to Approach the 
Study of Historic Fertility Declines? 
Simon Szreter  
Abstract: »Theorien und Heuristiken: Mit welcher Herangehensweise sollte 
man historische Geburtenrückgänge untersuchen?«. This paper argues that a 
move away from a unifying but teleological framework for studying fertility 
declines can only been intellectually emancipating and is a necessary precondi-
tion for scientific advance. The study of change in human reproduction is an 
immensely complex and multi-faceted problem which requires the combination 
of both quantitative and qualitative forms of evidence and their respective 
methodologies of enquiry. The theoretical challenge is to construct an intellec-
tually facilitating heuristic framework for synthesis of comparative, multi-
disciplinary study of the multiple fertility declines that have occurred, not to 
seek a replacement ‘general narrative’ for discredited demographic transition 
and modernisation theories. Quantitative historical demography can only gain 
in its explanatory power by engaging with studies which also incorporate re-
search into such qualitative aspects of gender as sex and power and which ad-
dress a more historicist understanding of the role of culture by exploring its re-
lationship with institutions, ideology and politics. It is argued that a number of 
recent, contextualized local and comparative studies of fertility declines are 
demonstrating how productively to combine quantitative and qualitative meth-
ods to explore rigorously these aspects of the history of fertility declines. 
Within the heuristic framework envisaged here, priorities for further research 
in the future would include exploring comparatively the relationship between 
reproductive change and communication communities with respect to the ideo-
logically and politically-mediated issues of sex, religion, health, disease and 
education. 
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lege, Cambridge, CB2 1TP, UK; e-mail: srss@cam.ac.uk. 
 With thanks to Dr Sian Pooley for her critical comments on the penultimate versions of this 
paper; and to participants who commented on earlier versions delivered at the workshop, 
“Fertility declines in the past, present and future: what we don’t know and what we need to 
know”; held at the Department of Geography & Downing College, University of Cam-
bridge, 15-17 July 2009, organized by Dr Eilidh Garret; at the meeting “New issues in his-
torical demography and family history” organised by the French Société de Démographie 
historique, Italian SIDES and Spanish-Portuguese ADH meeting will organize in Lyon, 
within the Entretiens Jacques Cartier, Lyons November 96-Dec 1 2009; and the conference, 
“Fertility in the History of the 20th Century: Trends, Theories, Public Discourses, and Poli-
cies” held in Berlin-Brandenburg Akademie der Wissenschaften Berlin, January 21-23, 
2010. 
 66 
Keywords: fertility declines, historical demography, theory, heuristics, quanti-
tative and qualitative methods; communication communities, power, sex, gen-
der, culture, institutions, religion, health, disease, education. 
1. Introduction 
In his stimulating and challenging article ‘Science without laws’ Mikołaj 
Szołtysek has argued that recent trends in the study of fertility declines have 
created an epistemological crisis for the discipline of historical demography 
(Szołtysek 2007). The key propositions of a previously dominant theory of 
fertility decline, closely associated with the Princeton Office of Population 
Research, have all been effectively challenged over the last two or three dec-
ades by an accumulation of historical, anthropological and other empirical 
studies. Attempts by some demographers, such as Ron Lesthaeghe and Dirk 
van de Kaa, to revitalize a unifying general theory for researching fertility 
change are seemingly contradicted or just ignored by other scholars’ work. 
Consequently we are now in a situation where there is a proliferation of ‘often 
incommensurable scientific discourses’, which seem only to affirm the radical 
‘heterogeneity’ of fertility declines. Szołtysek concludes that ‘The proliferation 
of discourses will likely become the most serious threat to the disciplinary 
identity of the future historical demographic studies of fertility’ (Szołtysek 
2007, 32). 
I am certainly happy to plead guilty to being one of the many scholars who 
have contributed with their research during the last three decades to bringing 
about this state of affairs. However, while this may constitute an epistemologi-
cal crisis for one particular approach to the study of fertility declines, I would 
view the achievement of emancipating the study of human reproductive vari-
ability from the confines of modernisation’s singular teleology as an unalloyed 
scientific gain for the field as a whole. To a Cambridge-raised historian, it is a 
great irony that the eminent historian who was Master of Peterhouse here when 
the young Tony Wrigley was the College’s Bursar in the mid-1960s, Sir Her-
bert Butterfield, should have published his celebrated denunciation of teleo-
logical approaches to our understanding of the past, The Whig Interpretation of 
History, as early as 1931, at the beginning of the same decade in which Talcott 
Parsons published The Structure of Social Action in 1937, the founding work of 
structural functionalist evolutionary sociology which provided the intellectual 
basis for the thoroughly teleological modernization view of history that under-
pinned the demographic transition theory of the Princeton school (Butterfield 
1931; Parsons 1937). Butterfield’s text was an eloquent demonstration of how 
presentist, teleological interpretations of the past were little more than political 
ideologies triumphalising the present at the cost of genuine understanding 
either of the past itself or of the true nature of the often far from straightfor-
ward pathway of historical change which had led to the present.  
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It was not until the publication in 1970 of Alvin Gouldner’s The coming cri-
sis of Western Sociology that American sociology truly woke up to the ideo-
logical bias in Parsons’ theory of ‘the evolutionary universals’ – those institu-
tional features supposedly needed for any society to make the transition from 
traditional to modern: 
What this implies is that the “free enterprise system” of American society is a 
uniquely powerful embodiment of all the important evolutionary universals 
that, according to Parsons, have ever been invented. That is, it implies that the 
U.S.A. represents the apex of evolutionary development, that is the most ad-
vanced of modern nations.’1 
Thus, for historians approaching the task of understanding and explaining 
dramatic variation in reproduction during the past, the notion that our research 
efforts should be guided by a unifying social science theory, which looks re-
markably like a Whig interpretation of history, has never carried much scien-
tific appeal. Szołtysek’s observation about the lack of a humanities training 
among most of the key figures involved in the Princeton European Fertility 
Project is highly relevant in this regard – I wonder if any of them had ever read 
Butterfield’s text? Yet it was essential reading for all history undergraduates, at 
least in Britain, in the 1950s and 1960s. 
So I, for one, as a trained historian who read Butterfield’s denunciation of 
all forms of Whig history in the sixth form at school in the 1970s, am quite 
happy to put on one side any and all teleological grand theories or general 
narratives about ‘the’ fertility decline, or ‘the demographic transition’. These 
narratives invite us to view fertility change as a generic phenomenon with 
determinative causes, which the right kind of singular, positivistic methodology 
can analyse and identify. History teaches us to be wary of these theories; this is 
not how the processes of historical change occur. However, this does not nec-
essarily mean that therefore I subscribe to an entirely relativist position: that 
any and all questions and methodologies are equally valid and useful where 
research into fertility declines is concerned. It does, however, seem to me that 
research into the history of variation in human reproduction is an extraordinari-
ly complex and multi-faceted subject and that we can only help ourselves by 
deploying all useful and appropriate means available, in terms of sources of 
evidence and methods of enquiry. Quantitative methods, and the prior existence 
of accurate records of demographic events occupy a certain position of primacy 
in this field of intellectual endeavour, because they are absolutely essential in 
order for us to have a subject of study in the first place. But once we have satis-
fied ourselves that we have used this valuable methodology to observe accu-
rately when, where and how changes in the different components of fertility 
                                                             
1  Cf. Gouldner (1970, 367); C. Wright Mills had first launched a critique of Parsonian struc-
tural functionalism as early as 1959 but his premature death at 45 years old in 1962 robbed 
US liberal sociology of its heterodox voice: Mills (1959). 
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have occurred, other methods of enquiry, including the purely qualitative, can 
then be of enormous importance in the pursuit of understanding and explana-
tions for these changes. 
I take it, then, that Szołtysek’s paper is posing the question, what is the form 
of the theoretical framework that we can most productively use to advance our 
comparative understanding of changing fertility in the recent past? I would 
argue that to begin to answer this question we must first fully acknowledge the 
complex nature of the intellectual problem we are confronting. Fertility is a 
central part of the larger topic of reproduction, or, if you like, the more ancient 
historical term, generation.2 To understand, to interpret and to explain large-
scale changes in fertility in human societies can, in principle, involve us in the 
examination of just about everything there is to study about those populations 
and their societies. Reproduction is influenced by laws, governments, civic 
associations, other institutions of governance, religious and secular beliefs, 
sexual codes and moral norms, emotions, aspirations and myths, physical and 
biological environments, technologies, forms of knowledge and cultures, social 
and ethnic divisions, relations of power, hierarchies of status and symbols of 
prestige, forms of employment, consumption patterns and economic relations, 
ideologies of gender, inter-generational relations, and, of course, the contingent 
internal and external political and economic histories of societies. This is, in 
short, a most formidable subject to attempt to study and comprehend! Most of 
us, most of the time can only realistically attempt to study aspects and parts of 
the whole. Our one advantage in this uneven intellectual struggle is that there 
are many of us and we can learn from each other and assist each other to build 
a comparative knowledge. However, as Szołtysek’s article warns, our numbers 
are only a strength to us if we can avoid becoming a cacophonous squabbling 
Babel and, instead, synthesise and integrate our very different contributions. In 
the long term trustworthy comparative insight and understanding of changing 
reproduction will only be possible on the basis of researches involving in-depth 
and multi-dimensional knowledge of societies and their many unique histories. 
In my opinion the theory of demographic transition, or the associated idea 
that there can be a general explanatory (and therefore predictive) theory of 
fertility decline has been scientifically valuable to the discipline of demo-
graphic history during the last sixty years or so, despite itself. It has provided a 
shared language and a shared target for much productive historical research 
which has essentially been conceived in critique of the theory. To have ‘a uni-
versally valid “grand narrative” about how fertility changes’ is not something 
any of us, as sceptical rationalists, should necessarily be striving for; or any-
                                                             
2  ‘Generation to Reproduction’ is the title of a multi-disciplinary Wellcome-funded 5-year 
research project underway in Cambridge University 2009-14, co-ordinated by the Depart-
ment of the History and Philosophy of Science, to reassess the history of reproduction from 
the Greeks to the present: <http://www.reproduction.group.cam.ac.uk/>. 
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thing we would ever want to believe in. But it has provided a provocative criti-
cal target against which to launch our research enterprises and one that has 
been understood internationally and across many disciplines.  
Over sixty years of historical and contemporary demographic research into 
fertility variation has occurred since Notestein and Davis presented their ca-
nonical statements of transition theory in 1944 (Notestein 1945; Davis 1945). 
This has shown what great diversity in reproduction can be found in the em-
pirical and historical record. Many different sources and methods have been 
required to research and understand why reproduction has changed with a 
particular, unique narrative in each nation’s history. Contrary to the presump-
tions of a general theory, this demonstrates that we can only derive our com-
parative knowledge of reproduction from the study and understanding of differ-
ence, not from the attempt to impose a grid of similarity. This is a key principle 
of historical method and knowledge: the appreciation of difference and what 
we can learn from it. It is the heart of Butterfield’s point about the fallacy of 
Whig teleological history being unable to truly research and learn about the 
past and about the processes of historical change itself, because it has pre-
judged the whole issue as simply being a matter of showing in what ways the 
past was deficient to the ideologically-preferred and ‘known’ present, with all 
the effort devoted to charting the triumphal rise of the favoured features of the 
present from the imperfect past. For the Princeton historical demographers, 
armed with their highly selective fertility indices for interrogating the past, they 
were only really interested in charting how parity-specific stopping behaviour 
had risen to world dominance. This was to abstract one aspect of reproduction 
from its context and to miss so much else in the story. 
The study of fertility change has both benefited from and been limited by a 
necessary bias towards quantitative methodologies and associated positivist 
epistemological assumptions. The immense benefits of this intellectual heritage 
have been – and continue to be – precision and clarity in working with very 
large amounts of data to produce reliable information about exactly when, 
where and among which sections of variously defined populations different 
forms of fertility change have occurred, along with significant related informa-
tion about mortality and, where available, migration, too. The importance of 
this achievement cannot be overestimated since, put simply, without these 
products of a positivist demographic science we would all be chasing moon-
beams, as the history of the eighteenth-century ‘Population Controversy’ in 
Britain illustrates (Glass 1973; Rusnock 2002). However, to then study the 
causes of demographic change only with reference to other forms of informa-
tion which can also be counted and rendered quantifiable alongside the biologi-
cal events of births and deaths, is to impose an entirely counter-productive and 
virtually arbitrary limitation on the intellectual scope of such enquiry. Most of 
the important influences upon reproduction – and therefore upon observable 
fertility patterns – such as aspects of politics and power, religious beliefs, moral 
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norms, ideologies of love and sex, and all the variety of social and cultural 
institutions – can only be appropriately studied through a range of more ‘quali-
tative’ methods. Ideally, therefore, a theoretical framework to study fertility 
declines comparatively requires a specification which combines the quantita-
tive virtues of demography with an acknowledged role for the more qualitative 
methods of disciplines such as history and anthropology to provide fully con-
textualised and dynamic empirical studies of all the significant, but often un-
quantifiable influences on reproduction. 
It is particularly important, if we are to learn about and from the past, there-
fore, that a general theory – or heuristic framework – should not commit us to 
any potentially methodologically exclusionary position. An approach which 
facilitates comparative understanding of fertility change will not be possible 
without deploying a full range of both quantitative and qualitative methodolo-
gies. To allow such a catholic range of methods to combine together fruitfully 
requires a particularly open theoretical matrix, which avoids biasing our view-
point and privileging certain representations of ‘the data’ or excluding certain 
forms of analysis. To start with the notion that there is – or should be – a single 
“grand narrative” is just such a bias.  
However, neither can any general heuristic framework for comparative re-
search be simply descriptive and aimless. It should ideally give us a conceptual 
order with which to understand the diversity and complexity of our intellectual 
task. It should help us to articulate together the combination of distinct methods 
and sources we need to employ, rather than simply presenting us with an al-
most infinite set of intellectual tasks, a mere listing of alternative investigative 
methods and approaches.  
2. Multiple Fertility Declines: 
A First Step Towards a General Approach 
The foundational methodological principle for constructing a general facilitat-
ing theoretical framework of this sort for research in demographic history is to 
eschew the notion that there has been a single, general or grand narrative of 
fertility decline and to use instead the working assumption that there have been 
many quite different fertility declines. It may emerge, at a much later stage of 
comparative review of the findings on each society and community studied, 
that there are certain quite general similarities but this would be a matter of 
inductive discovery, not a deductive premise before our enquiries begin. While 
it is true that the challenging and contested ideas surrounding birth control have 
certainly enjoyed an international history of exchange and debate, as has the 
dissemination of the technology of birth control, this aspect of international 
exchange in no way implies a globally homogenous history. That there have 
been internationally mobilised discourses of Malthusianism, eugenics, Neo-
Malthusianism, transition theory, family planning and others does not negate 
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the fundamental principle that fertility declines have occurred in quite distinct 
ways in different national and community contexts. The reception, use and 
meaning of an item of technology, such as a condom, IUD or contraceptive pill, 
depends on cultural and political context.3 
This foundational proposition that we should explore the diversity of multi-
ple fertility declines follows directly from an elementary and indisputable 
property of human fertility throughout history: its intrinsic variability among 
individuals and couples. Due to the phenomena of involuntary innate and ac-
quired sterility, individual women have extraordinarily varied reproductive 
capacities, even with an approximately equal exposure to the chances of con-
ception. A significant minority in every population are biologically unable to 
conceive or carry to term a single fetus, a further few percent only able to pro-
duce a single birth and so on, with, at the other extreme some women produc-
ing viable livebirths – sometimes even multiple livebirths – over twenty times 
in the course of their lives. Consequently, human residential and ‘family’ 
groups have always varied widely in their fertility patterns, having to adapt in 
many diverse ways to the natural lottery of fecundity.4 There has always been 
great variability in the fertility of individuals of both sexes and in the sizes and 
forms of families and households; and thus there has always been the potential 
for observation and reflection among individuals in all communities on the 
advantages and drawbacks of these differences in rates and patterns of child-
bearing. Given this, whenever changes have occurred in the ecological, eco-
nomic or social environment in favour of greater or less household size or 
fertility than the prevailing norm, there would always have been plenty of real-
life examples of fertility both greater than and less than the norm for all to see – 
and ponder the relative advantages and disadvantages. It is therefore only on 
extremely restrictive and unrealistic assumptions about the supposed incapacity 
of ‘non-modern’ men and women to reflect on and regulate their fertility that 
there would not already be many, many such adaptive multiple fertility regimes 
already in existence long before the dramatic documented changes of European 
                                                             
3  See Matthew Connelly’s (2008) recent ambitious and controversial ‘global’ history of the 
twentieth-century birth control movement. Connelly’s study demonstrates the diverse for-
tunes of the individuals and their ideas and of the technologies of contraception as these 
were refracted through different national political contexts at different times in the twenti-
eth century, notably for instance the work of Margaret Sanger in USA and in India. For a 
much older study documenting something similar, see Glass (1940). 
4  Thus, the well-documented and ubiquitous practice of service and apprenticeship in early 
modern England, which has been described as a system of ‘ex post facto family planning’, 
whereby young adults from about age 12 left the family home to reside and work in other 
households where there was a labour need. This represents a classic example of social and 
institutional adjustment to the natural lottery of fecundity (cf. Kussumaul 1981). Other ex-
amples would include Mende fosterage arrangements in West Africa analysed in Bledsoe 
(1990). 
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and North American peoples from the eighteenth to the mid-twentieth centu-
ries.  
Although the Princeton project was prepared, despite the then-available 
plethora of anthropological and historical evidence, to make such an unwar-
ranted assumption about ‘uncontrolled’ fertility prevailing throughout early 
modern Europe, demographic historians have established beyond any doubt 
that a multiplicity of fertility regimes regulating reproduction in many diverse 
ways did indeed exist in early modern Britain and other parts of Europe, as 
well as in the many societies previously studied by ethnologists and anthro-
pologists.5 Thus, rather than conceptualising the problem of studying fertility 
change during the last two centuries of European and North American history 
as one of explaining an entirely novel singularity, referred to as ‘the’ fertility 
decline, we need a theoretical framework which embraces the continual vari-
ability and dynamics found in human reproduction at all times throughout the 
documented history and wherever anthropologists investigate the subject. Fer-
tility declines during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries were significant 
events but they did not comprise a single common phenomenon of change from 
one uniform, steady-state of unrestricted, high fertility to another such uniform 
‘modern’ condition of planned, low fertility. Reproductive patterns changed in 
diverse fashions among multiple fertility regimes that had already been regulat-
ing their fertility in many different ways. 
When the Princeton European Fertility project found that there were indeed 
a diversity of fertility decline patterns visible within nations, it was emphasized 
that these most obviously seemed to correlate with religious and linguistic-
ethnic difference. The principal conclusion that was drawn from this was that it 
showed that the economic and material conditions related to economic growth, 
rising living standards and urbanization were not as determinative of fertility 
declines as the original version of ‘demographic transition’ theory had postu-
lated. Instead ‘culture’ and ideational change were proclaimed to be more sig-
nificant determinants, focusing attention on the extent to which different reli-
gious and ethnic inheritances were susceptible to ‘secularisation’ of their 
values.6 Something of the same form of ‘cultural determinism’ informs the 
more recent ‘second demographic transition’ thinking, which invokes yet an-
other generalising sociological theory about cultural ‘individuation’ in ‘post-
                                                             
5  The research of the Cambridge Group for the History of Population has demonstrated 
widespread control of reproduction in early modern England through late marriage, high 
proportions of celibacy and low levels of illegitimacy (Wrigley and Schofield 1981; Laslett 
and Oostereven 1973). Long-standing studies which have documented the wide range of 
fertility control practised by different societies and cultures have included (Carr Saunders 
1922; Himes 1936; Ford 1945). 
6  These conclusions were presented in the summary volume of the Princeton project 
(Coale/Watkins 1986), particularly in chapters 6-8 and 10. 
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modern’, affluent, consumerist and risk-averse societies (Lesthaeghe and van 
de Kaa 1986; van de Kaa 1987). 
Consequent on the findings that emerged from the Princeton project about 
the importance of the ‘culture of rationality’ or secularization, A.J. Coale de-
veloped his theoretical framework of the three logical ‘preconditions’ for ra-
tional family planning, which Lesthaeghe has recently reformulated as ‘ready, 
willing and able’ (Coale 1973; Lesthaeghe and Vanderheoft 2001). According 
to this theory, a rational, secular approach by decision-making parents was 
required before fertility could be truly controlled in the modern sense. This 
means that the various possible impediments to the achievement of this mod-
ern, rational mentality can be conceptualised and then their presence or absence 
in different societies can be modeled and studied so these factors can be 
tracked empirically to show how such a planning approach originated in a 
society and how it then spread or was impeded. Coale’s approach has enabled a 
link to be made with a revived version of the venerable tradition of ‘diffusion-
ism’ in the study of fertility decline. Earlier, simpler notions of diffusion had 
envisaged fertility decline spreading, by analogy with a contagion, as accept-
ability of contraceptive technology ‘diffused’ through society or, in a more 
sophisticated version, as the ideals and values associated with small families 
diffused.7 Coale’s approach promised to render this more rigorous by identify-
ing three separable, empirically testable ‘cultural’ conditions, which would all 
have to be satisfied before rational family planning could be adopted, so ena-
bling the sources or impediments to the diffusion of such modern birth control-
ling practices to be identified.  
The fundamental problem with diffusionism as an approach, even in this 
more sophisticated and methodologically discriminating form embracing 
Coale’s three preconditions, is that it assumes that in order to explain fertility 
declines our primary goal is the need to explain a changed ‘mental state’, value 
system or ‘culture’ from one that does not plan its fertility to one that does. 
This way of looking at the problem, though of course immensely logically 
plausible (it would not have been taken seriously otherwise) nevertheless he-
roically abstracts from and stylises the problem to be addressed. The beginning 
point and end point of the process to be studied are presented as two polar 
opposites. This may be a correct assumption… but, there again, it may not. 
There is nothing in the approach to guard against the possibility that this di-
chotomy is an entirely arbitrary, invented and mistaken way of posing the 
historical problem.  
How could it be a mistake? Firstly, because, as pointed out, there were many 
important senses in which reproduction was carefully regulated before the 
                                                             
7  On such earlier forms of diffusionist thinking in application to explanations of fertility 
decline and in the discipline of anthropology, see Szreter (1996, 13-20 and ch. 5, notes 109, 
110 and ch.10 note 56). For a recent review see Palloni (2003). 
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modern observable ‘fertility declines’, embracing also various rational strate-
gies and tactics in relation to marital fertility.8 Therefore ‘the beginning point’ 
may be qualitatively quite dissimilar in different historical societies or among 
different sections and communities of a society. Secondly, in a society with low 
fertility, after the historic process of fertility decline has occurred, many indi-
viduals and couples even with very low fertility may not see themselves as 
consciously rationally planning their families in any particular way.9 Thirdly, 
there is the important point raised above about the ubiquitous, involuntary 
variability of fecundity – and therefore fertility – in all cultures. Among the 
strongest influences on people’s motives to restrain their fertility were the 
practical lessons in front of them from observing others around them faring 
better or worse in the changing economic and social circumstances they all 
faced, because of their involuntarily-produced larger or smaller families. In 
responding to the practical examples of what they could see worked best for the 
family’s survival and living standards among their neighbours, we know that in 
English modern history, for instance, they primarily drew upon the range of 
fertility regulators that their society and culture already had a long history of 
utilizing: late marriage, non-marriage, abstinence, coitus interruptus, various 
efforts to deploy cervical obstructions or spermicides, douching, abortifacients 
and abortion (Santow 1993; Fisher and Szreter 2003). When fertility declined 
continuously and dramatically in England from 1877 to 1937, use of condoms 
and other ‘modern’ barrier methods were a minority practice throughout the 
whole process. Thus, in this well-documented case marital fertility declined for 
six decades without a significant cultural change across society in any of 
Coale’s three preconditions having played an integral role in that process. This, 
at least, is exactly what has been concluded from the most detailed recent em-
pirical research on the history of fertility declines in England and Wales. It has 
required an eclectic combination of methods of enquiry, combining both re-
evaluation of the official, quantitative demographic sources and the pioneering 
creation of qualitative oral history sources enabling us to attend to the voices, 
perceptions and testimony of ordinary people involved in fertility declines in 
interwar England and Wales, to be able to demonstrate this empirically (Szreter 
1996; Szreter and Garrett 2000; Garrett et al. 2001), chs. 5-7; Fisher 2006; 
Moore 2008, ch. 5; Szreter and Fisher, 2010). 
Note that there is nothing in this alternative, historicist approach and in its 
findings, which negates the broad validity of one of Coale’s several premises, 
namely that English society by the 1960s and 1970s – exactly at the time Coale 
formulated his model – was, in general terms, a society of family planners, 
                                                             
8  For recent research demonstrating this, reported in this journal, see Schröter (2007), 
Gehrmann (2007). On pre-modern England see above. See also the results of methodologi-
cally innovative new research on the Netherlands: Van Bavel and Kok (2010). 
9  This is confirmed in the British oral history evidence, for instance, see Fisher (2000; 2006). 
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observing his three preconditions. However, the crucial point which an histo-
rian will want to emphasise is that this does not entitle us to suppose that an 
earlier process of the ‘diffusion’ of these social and cultural characteristics 
played any crucial role in the history of changing fertility during the sixty-year 
period of secular decline, which had ended approximately a generation earlier 
in the 1930s. It may well be that the kind of ‘modern’ culture of ‘family plan-
ning’, in which Coale found himself in 1960s USA, and which also existed in 
England at that time – and which Coale modeled in the early 1970s – was the 
consequence of quite social discourses of relatively recent provenance, involv-
ing popular ideological and cultural reflections upon the small family norm. 
The importance of family planning, avoiding illegitimacy and unwanted births 
was certainly a discourse that prevailed in a peculiarly dominant fashion in 
immediately post-war, liberal democratic, affluent western societies, along with 
the widespread adoption of two new contraceptive technologies, the pre-
lubricated condom (a 1950s invention) and the pill (in the 1960s).10 But these 
were all characteristics of the kind of societies that had come to exist in the 
postwar era, some time after the historic fertility declines of western Europe 
and North America has run their course, and they were very different places – 
socially, culturally and demographically – from the societies which had experi-
enced sharp fertility declines, c.1860-1940. To conclude, as Coale did, that 
certain features of contemporary American and European societies which had 
become normative in the 1960s and 1970s, which were generally associated 
with family planning behaviour at that time, were precisely the same features 
which had caused a widespread fall in fertility in USA and Western Europe 
during the course of the previous 100 years, appears, to an historian, little more 
than an unwarranted, arbitrary and a-historical imposition. In terms of causal 
thinking it looks to an historian remarkably like placing the cart before the 
horse: all the processes bound up with the fertility declines before the 1940s 
must have contributed in various ways to the affluent consumerist and rela-
tively secure welfare entitlement societies that emerged across the western 
world after WWII, where a public discourse and practice of careful and reflex-
ive family planning at last made perfect sense to the vast majority of the popu-
lation; but to suppose that the latter caused the former is to confuse effect with 
cause. This is the defining flaw in teleological approaches to understanding 
historical change. 
The methodological premise of multiple fertility declines is the opposite of 
that assumed by the Princeton approach. It is, however, analogous to how eco-
nomic historians, a social science disciplinary group who deal with closely 
related intellectual problems of historical causation, now understand the pro-
                                                             
10  On the socially conservative postwar promotion of the norms of small planned families by 
companionate marriage partners in Britain, for instance, see: Finch and Summerfield 1991; 
Riley 1983; Lewis 1990. On condoms see Cook 2004, 133-9; on the pill see Marks 2001.  
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cess of industrialisation, economic development and economic modernisation. 
Industrialisation, like fertility decline, has also occurred repeatedly in the histo-
ries of many different countries – in fact the same set of ‘developed’ countries, 
which have all experienced completed fertility declines. However, economic 
historians would today all accept that this has happened in a quite unique way 
in each nation’s history. There was a time in the immediate post-war decades 
when it was widely believed that economic growth was a generic, repeatable 
process, principally driven by the master causal factor of achieving an incre-
mental capital:output ratio. This viewpoint attained its most complete expres-
sion as late as 1960 with the publication that year of W.W. Rostow’s best-
selling The stages of economic growth. However, it is the opposite, historicist 
view, articulated most clearly in Gerschenkron’s contemporaneous, masterly 
essay ‘Economic backwardness in Historical Perspective’, which is now ac-
cepted by all economic historians.11  
Gerschenkron’s essay made the logically impregnable point that no country 
could simply follow England’s path or formula for industrialisation partly 
because her position as first-comer was itself evidence of various unique ad-
vantages she enjoyed, but also because she had reaped numerous additional 
advantages of being first into global markets, thereby changing forever, with 
her global trading empire, the context for all those following. These advantages 
were, by definition, not available in the same way for later followers, who, 
Gerschenkron argued, would necessarily need to rely more and more on the 
active guidance of their central states to achieve successful industrialisation in 
the increasingly competitive global environment. Thus, Gerschenkron proposed 
a general ‘law’ about the character of repeated industrialisations but the valid-
ity of his general law depended on acknowledging that each case of industriali-
sation manifested itself in a unique and different way! Note also that Ger-
schenkron’s thesis that every industrialisation is qualitatively different does not 
deny that they share some features, ideas and innovations in common. For 
instance, in each case investment in a mineral energy source technology has 
been an essential feature. But having this in common does not amount to the 
claim that any two histories of industrialisation happened in essentially similar 
ways. The exact configuration of social, political and ideological influences 
and forces was different in each case. Similarly with repeated fertility declines: 
they happened in the contexts of distinct and unique trajectories of industriali-
sation in each country and they also happened in a unique context of the par-
ticular institutions, ideologies, politics and social and economic policies in each 
country (and the unique ways in which these all interacted over the course of 
the period of declining fertility). To be able to specify analytically that an in-
dustrialised economy is one that can continuously increase per capita national 
                                                             
11  Gerschenkron 1962, this was the fully developed version of an essay published in 1951. 
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income does not provide us with an adequate historical account of how its 
industrialisation occurred. Similarly, to be able to specify analytically the logi-
cal requirements for a society of careful family planners does not offer us an 
historical account of how any particular society came to endorse this disposi-
tion. 
Indeed the most sophisticated thinking in the social sciences today, both 
among those in development studies and sociologists of the contemporary 
‘globalised’ developed world, envisages that, contrary to the recent superficial 
certainties of modernisation, neoliberal economics, the Washington consensus 
and Fukuyama-style ‘End of History’, just as there have been multiple path-
ways through economic growth, there are also today ‘multiple modernities’ in 
the world’s different societies and cultures.12 Among the developed societies of 
the world there are multiple welfare regimes, there are multiple models of 
market economies (Esping-Andersen 1990; 1996; Wade 1990). It is entirely 
consistent with this that demographers should approach their studies with the 
understanding that there have been multiple fertility declines – multiple demo-
graphic pathways to multiple demographic modernities. There are today multi-
ple low fertility regimes – each of them dynamic and continuing to evolve – not 
a singular type of ‘post second demographic transition’ regime; indeed, USA 
itself is clearly as distinctive for its relatively high fertility as Italy is for its 
very low fertility (see the debate triggered by Caldwell and Schindlmayr 2003; 
Billari et al. 2004; Caldwell and Schindlmayr 2004). 
3. Communication Communities 
The principle of multiple fertility declines is perhaps even more radical as a 
guide to research than it appears at first sight. Not only does it imply that dif-
ferent nations have had quite distinct reproductive histories, but also that there 
has been significant variation in fertility change trajectories within nations. The 
latter was a principal argument to emerge from my (Szreter 1996) detailed 
study of the demographic evidence of fertility declines in England and Wales, a 
conclusion also confirmed by a subsequent (Szreter 2001) collaborative study, 
using a distinct evidence base (Szreter 1996; Garrett et al. 2001). A number of 
other, well-contextualised historical and anthropological studies of fertility 
change in other societies, fortunate enough to have accessed sufficiently rich 
sources of evidence, have also confirmed this.13 Of course this immediately 
raises the issue of how to demarcate these sub-national divisions of reproduc-
                                                             
12  Bayly 2004. For an historical enquiry into the notion of ‘multiple modernities’, see the 
contributors to: Daedalus Special issue on ‘Early Modernities’ (Summer 1998); and also to 
Daedalus Special issue on ‘Multiple Modernities’ (Winter 2000). 
13  Early examples include: Haines 1979; Schneider and Schneider 1984; 1992; Bean, Mineau, 
and Anderton 1990). 
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tive change? What are the social units within each nation that differentiate 
experiences of fertility decline? This is where we need a combination of theory 
and detailed empirical knowledge to decide in each case – respecting the his-
toricist principle of difference. Theory can be used to tell us what we should be 
looking for, but it is only through knowledge of the historical society in ques-
tion and examination of the evidence that we can make competent judgements 
about this methodologically crucial issue.  
Anthropology and psychology inform us that we need first to be able to 
identify who are playing the socially significant primary roles in relation to 
reproduction in the society in question and what are their relative powers? 
Fathers and husbands, wives and mothers, other kin (vertical and lateral) of 
either sex with significant authority. Secondly we need to identify what are the 
principal influences upon these different agents. For instance, religious or other 
ethnic beliefs related to reproduction (perhaps distinguished by sex); sources of 
livelihood and the economic or gender implications of this for fertility; gov-
ernment policies and agencies and their provisions or sanctions (such as social 
security, education, health). In the case of England and Wales during the period 
1870-1914, scrutiny of the available evidence, bearing in mind these theoretical 
considerations, led to the conclusion that religious distinctions and extended 
kin were usually relatively unimportant influences, whereas the question of 
how husbands and wives earned the family’s income was a powerful cause of 
multiple distinct fertility regimes and declines. This was because in this par-
ticular society at this time, there was a great diversity of industries and forms of 
employment, many of which were quite locally or even regionally concen-
trated. In many of these industries there had been quite distinctive histories of 
labour relations resulting in a range of different outcomes with respect to re-
muneration levels of different categories of workers and the relative exclusion 
(or more unusually inclusion) of women and children in relation to paid em-
ployment outside the home (Szreter 1996, ch. 9). 
This meant that in British society during the period of the secular fertility 
decline the crucial social roles of husbands/fathers and wives/mothers were 
highly differentiated, due to the various kinds of employment they pursued in 
different industries. This effect was amplified because of the geographical 
concentration found in many industries, resulting in quite distinctive communi-
ties of considerable geographical extent. In 1996 I termed these ‘communica-
tion communities’, to get across just how distinctive they each were (often with 
their own dialects) but also how the individuals within them would mutually 
influence each other because of sharing similar commonsense expectations of 
the roles that adult partners would perform in marriage and in the community, 
which could be quite different from those prevailing in other such communi-
ties, where a different mix of gendered labour market opportunities had been 
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historically negotiated between workforces and employers (a process increas-
ingly mediated by the state itself in Britain, incidentally).14 
However, the importance of industries in influencing the dominant form that 
communication communities took in relation to reproduction would not neces-
sarily be a universal feature of British society at this time. In applying these 
same concepts and theoretical approach to another part of the United Kingdom, 
the province of Ulster in Ireland for instance, it would be surprising if religious 
differences did not emerge as an equally or more powerful constitutive force in 
creating the communication communities which experienced multiple fertility 
declines in that society.15 In a similar context of polarised religious diversity, 
this has certainly been shown to have been the case by Anne-Françoise Praz in 
her excellent, carefully contextualised study of Catholic and Protestant com-
munities in Switzerland (Praz 2005). Thus, we need to use and deploy theory 
which can illuminate difference, not concepts and general narratives which 
shepherd our thinking towards uniformity. 
4. Embracing the Qualitative: Gender, Sex and Power  
If, therefore, we propose that, in order to investigate fertility declines in the 
past, present and future, we should seek to explore all the difference and vari-
ety found in contexts and processes, rather than attempt to search for analytical 
commonalities, what, then, are the further theoretical considerations which 
could heuristically guide this daunting research programme, beyond the idea of 
communication communities and multiple fertility declines? One of the several 
values and purposes of theory is to alert us to what we don’t know and what we 
need to know. Constructive theory leads us to ask new questions of the evi-
                                                             
14  Szreter (1996, ch. 10). Communication communities comprise the social networks through 
which persons acquire, reproduce and negotiate their social and gender identities. An indi-
vidual may identify with multiple communication communities with varying influences 
during their lifetimes in addition to those into which they are socialised. During the period 
of modern British history encompassing the fertility decline, c.1870-1950, the most power-
ful of such communication communities were often strongly related to the unique character-
istics of specific towns and other geographical localities, lodged in distinctive industrial 
regions with their diverse histories of gendered labour relations, resulting in distinctive sets 
of family and work roles for those living there. For an important new study by Sian Pooley 
which explores diverse fertility patterns in such communication communities, see Pooley 
(2009). Another recent doctoral study which has attempted to study declining fertility com-
paratively, though it did not explore the primary sources of communication communities 
with such depth and rigour as Pooley, has been: Atkinson (2010). On growing state media-
tion of labour relations, see Davidson (1985). 
15  For an early examination of this, see Grada (1985). A current Leverhulme-funded research 
project to examine this among a large sample of Catholic and Protestant Belfast households 
is currently being pursued by Eilidh Garrett, Alice Reid and Simon Szreter: ‘Housing, mo-
bility and the measurement of child health from the 1911 Irish census’, Leverhulme Re-
search Grant January 2010-December 2011.  
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dence and, if necessary, to try to find or construct new forms of evidence. The 
fields of demography and historical demography have witnessed a classic epi-
sode of just this kind of theoretical advance during the last two decades or so, 
in the form of the spectacular rise to the top of the intellectual agenda of the 
concept of gender. It is not so long since Alison MacKinnon and Susan Wat-
kins published their much-cited articles berating demographers for studying 
fertility declines as if women were bystanders to the whole process (Watkins 
1993; Mackinnon 1995). For other humanities disciplines, notably history, the 
rise of gender as a re-configuring conceptual category was something of a 
political process allied to the rise of feminism and also an empirical contribu-
tion, as it is acknowledged that much of the pioneering gender literature from 
the 1970s onwards has consisted of historians’ innovative studies of women in 
history and more recently of gender as a constitutive relationship.16 For demog-
raphy the adoption of gender as an integral component of its understanding of 
fertility change came rather later. It was partly experienced as a political event 
at the 1984 Cairo conference, but gender was also a methodological and theo-
retical revolution that has by no means as yet exerted its full potential for re-
invigorating our historical understanding of fertility declines.17 A recent collec-
tion edited by Angelique Janssens (2007) has showcased the new research of a 
number of scholars who are now developing this intellectual agenda. 
Taking gender seriously requires a heuristic framework to incorporate at 
least two further important theoretical considerations, where the study of fertil-
ity declines is concerned: sex and power. Previously, although demography 
was strangely gender-blind as Watkins and Mackinnon protested, the manifest 
influence of power relations could not be plausibly entirely ignored. Instead its 
pervasive effects were acknowledged in a statistical form by use of the ‘profes-
sional model’ of social classes: a system for classifying households according 
to five or six social status gradations of male occupational categories, which 
was adopted by many official statistical agencies in the Anglophone world 
between the 1920s and 1950s and was used to depict the widespread class 
differences in fertility and mortality which approximately reflected the diverse 
influences of power in many different societies (Szreter 1993). There can be no 
doubting that dynamic social class relations have been important causes of the 
changing perceptions and behaviour which have resulted in the dramatic repro-
                                                             
16  Early historical studies included the pioneering collections edited by Vicinus (1972; 1977). 
The most widely-cited theoretical work by a gender historian has been Scott (1988). The 
most widely-cited theoretically informed early treatment which embraced the masculine 
dimension of gender was Connell (1995). 
17  For instance Müller and Schraut’s (2007) article in this journal was still protesting that 
studies of fertility decline pay insufficient attention to gender. 
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ductive changes of the last two centuries.18 However, the national unitary ‘pro-
fessional model’ of male occupational gradings provides only the crudest of 
summaries of the relationship between inequalities of power and demography. 
As has been shown, there is consequently enormous intellectual opportunity 
cost in continuing to defer to its statistical summary measures as a satisfactory 
model of what is a much more complex phenomenon: ‘social class’ requires 
study through contextualised accounts of communication communities, where 
the intimately related issues of gender, sex and power relations can all be ex-
amined in their relationship with changing patterns of reproduction.19 
The task of researching the dynamic relationship between sex, power and 
gender in relation to the histories of fertility declines is, therefore, a major 
research project which is only beginning to be addressed. Indeed, among de-
mographers most detailed empirical knowledge of this subject during the last 
two decades has emerged from the primarily epidemiological and public health 
research focused on the HIV-AIDS crisis. This has resulted in a strange disci-
plinary distortion and imbalance of knowledge about this subject. There is a 
very considerable amount of research now published on the pathologised rela-
tions of gender, sex and power in certain impoverished HIV-AIDS-afflicted 
communities and networks in the poor countries of the South during the last 
two decades of world history.20 However, we have had comparatively little 
effort devoted to researching empirical information about changing sexual 
behaviour and attitudes among the vast majority of the married populations of 
the world’s now-developed countries of the North during the last two centuries, 
during which fertility declined so significantly.  
There has been a good deal of historical research on nineteenth and twenti-
eth century sexuality in Europe and North America but it has mostly focused 
on analysing the texts produced by sexologists, doctors and other ideologists 
and the public discourses associated with laws and policing in relation to the 
‘transgressive’ topics of prostitution and ‘deviant’ sexualities.21 The assumed 
                                                             
18  For explorations of the relationship between social class, gendered sex education, courtship, 
and birth control practices in early and mid-twentieth-century Britain, see Szreter and 
Fisher (2010, chs. 2-3 and 6). 
19  Szreter (1996, chs. 6-10) offered an initial exploration of how the study of the fertility 
decline in England and Wales could be enriched by abandoning the ‘professional model’ of 
social class differentials when examining the historic occupational fertility data officially 
published from the 1911 census enquiry, data which had itself formed the original empirical 
basis for the creation of the ‘professional model’ of social classification (documented in 
ibid. chs. 2-4). 
20  The literature is voluminous. For contributions by well-known anthropological demogra-
phers, see for instance: Caldwell, Caldwell, and Quiggin 1989; Caldwell 2000; Setel 1999; 
Setel, Lewis, and Lyons 1999. The doyen of African historian has also provided a careful 
study Iliffe (2006). 
21 Important early historical studies were: Foucault 1990; Corbin 1990; Walkowitz 1980; 
Weeks 1981. Important recent studies have included Chauncey 1994; Houlbrook 2005. 
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reference point of ‘normal’, legal, marital, hetero-sexuality has attracted rela-
tively little research (see Hall 1991; Stanley 1995; Cook 2004). Before the 
revolution in norms of public discourse about sex during the 1960s sex was not 
something respectable citizens of modern liberal societies had believed should 
be discussed in public.22 In the absence of first-hand testimony from ordinary 
citizens historians necessarily took their cue from the evidence left policing 
activities and by extraordinary individuals, predominantly those progressives 
who were prepared to speak out and research the subject. The latter were moti-
vated by their perceived need for change, advocating something they termed 
‘companionate marriage’, the use of modern contraceptives and the promotion 
of mutual sexual pleasure among marriage partners. From these sources, histo-
rians have reproduced a history which conforms to these ideologists’ wishes, so 
that the history of sex, power and gender in relation to marriage and reproduc-
tion has been portrayed as a cross-cultural general process of ‘the rise of com-
panionate marriage’, neatly joined at the hip to the modernizing transition to 
reduced family size along with the rise of aspirational consumerism and secular 
values (for a recent study of this sort, see Collins 2003). Whereas the simplifi-
cations of cross-national ‘modernization’ theory, originating in American so-
ciological theorising of the 1930s and 1940s, are no longer considered accept-
able by demographic historians in their accounts of the history of change in the 
fertility of marriage, this crude general model of historical change in the sexual 
relations of marriage has somehow continued to enjoy a currency. 
The reason for this has been the relative paucity of research on the appropri-
ate kind of detailed empirical information. We need to know much more about 
sexuality in private in marriages in each country during the periods in which 
fertility declined. Trite general accounts of the rise of companionate marriage, 
which base their empirical support on the public and self-consciously progres-
sive, self-serving discourses of mid-twentieth century sexologists, birth control-
lers and marriage guidance counsellors, are inadequate guides to the attitudes 
and behaviour of the silent, socially conservative majority.23 Influential con-
temporary social theorists like Giddens and Beck have premised their socio-
logical theories of the changes in sexual culture happening in the West in the 
1990s and 2000s on rather uncritical acceptances of the notion of a prior rise of 
                                                             
22  Although there is certainly plenty of evidence to show that the drawing of a veil of respect-
ability over public discussion of sexual matters and the eventual restriction of the topic to a 
moralised medical discourse was a cultural accomplishment of the first half of the nine-
teenth century and did not reflect earlier norms of public discourse of late eighteenth and 
early nineteenth century Society, graphically documented in Gatrell 2006. For the best em-
pirical account of the subsequent ideological and cultural developments, see Mason (1994a, 
1994b). 
23  Historical accounts of British society which have offered much more nuanced and complex 
interpretations of change in marriage and sexual relations include notably: Light 1991; 
Langhamer 2006; 2007. 
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companionate marriage earlier in the twentieth century and these theories have 
in turn fed into demographers’ notions of a ‘second demographic transition’, as 
a general phenomenon. Empirical limitations in the theorising of Giddens and 
Beck, as descriptions of contemporary realities, are mirror images of the his-
torical limitations of the notion of the rise of companionate marriage.24 Of 
course, historical sources to research this private area of the recent past are not 
abundant and require imagination and interpretative skills to utilise. However, 
the methodology of oral history can be put to particularly effective use here, as 
Szreter and Fisher have demonstrated, along with a number of other scholars, 
who have used similar methodologies for researching sex, power and gender 
relations in other recent historical contexts (Szreter and Fisher 2010; see also 
Hirsch 2003; Gervais and Gauvreau 2003; Johnson-Hanks 2006; Gribaldo, 
Judd and Kertzer 2009). 
5. Theorising the Respective Roles of 
Culture, Institutions, Ideology and Politics 
One of the considerable theoretical advances that has occurred in the study of 
fertility change as a result of moving beyond the modernization framework, 
bequeathed by Parsons, Notestein and Coale, has been a much more discerning 
approach to ‘culture’. Again this has partly been the result of the astringent 
effect of having to think seriously about gender. A series of important anthro-
pological and historical studies and accompanying theoretical reflections have 
transformed historical demographers’ understanding of ‘culture’ and its influ-
ence on reproduction; and in doing so this has produced a much clearer specifi-
cation of the relationship between culture and institutions, and also how, in 
turn, they are both related to issues of ideology, contested power and politics.25 
The issue of power in the context of gender relations and changes in sexual 
practices and attitudes within marriage is of course only one aspect of the way 
in which the study of power needs to be incorporated into histories of fertility 
declines. Many aspects of political history, in addition to those related most 
directly to national debates over the laws governing ‘public morality’, mar-
riage, prostitution, abortion, sexuality, etc are of importance for understanding 
the diverse histories of fertility declines.26 For instance it is quite clear from all 
the research that has now been done on British demographic history, both be-
fore, during and after the fertility decline, that significant changes in the British 
                                                             
24  For an empirically-informed critique of the theoretical work of Giddens and Beck, see 
Jamieson 1999. 
25  Important contributions here have been: Lockwood (1995); and the essays in Greenhalgh 
(1995) and in Kertzer and Fricke (1997). 
26 On this, see for instance the range of stimulating studies in Ginsburg and Rapp (1995); or 
the collection of historical studies in Bock and Thane (1994). 
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state’s social security and welfare policies had enormous impacts on the na-
tion’s entire demographic system, including marriage itself – the social institu-
tion most directly influencing reproduction. The Old Poor Law and its increas-
ing generosity in the period of rising population growth c.1750-1820, its 
restraint in the 1820s and ruthless retrenchment in the 1830s, and, much later, 
the dramatic expansion of welfare services in the 1940s and 1950s, were each 
associated with trend-changes in marriage behaviour, with direct fertility con-
sequences (the latter resulting in the postwar, high fertility plateau lasting 
throughout the ‘golden age’ from 1945 until 1973 in Britain).27 
The changing history of the nation’s welfare regime was the product of its 
national political history and contending ideologies. However, as we benefit 
from more detailed and exacting local comparative research, it is also becom-
ing increasingly visible how a more local politics and related set of institutions 
influenced reproductive beliefs and behaviour during periods when fertility 
declined. In Alsace, in Canada and in Switzerland we are indebted to Kevin 
McQuillan and Anne-Françoise Praz, respectively, for their fine local studies, 
which have capitalised on the existence of religiously contrasting communities 
living cheek-by-jowl to demonstrate conclusively the influence of politics – 
above all else – at this local level in generating quite distinctively-gendered 
demographic regimes in neighbouring, religiously distinct communication 
communities, each with quite different fertility patterns (McQuillan 1999; 
2004; Praz 2005). Indeed, as Szoltyszek notes, the Schneiders have shown 
something similar due to the local political economy of class relations in Sicily, 
where two communication communities of landless peasants and landed elites, 
sharing the same language and religion in this case, nevertheless contrived two 
distinct fertility declines side by side. Important new research by Sian Pooley 
has also demonstrated the diversity of cultures of child-rearing and parenting in 
three contrasting localities in England during the period c.1860-1910, the 
weaving town of Burnley in Lancashire, the colliery town of Bishop Auckland 
in Co. Durham, and the affluent London commuter dormitory of Bromley in 
Kent. Pooley has demonstrated in detail the ways in which these different re-
gimes were intimately related to many different manifestations of local politics. 
This included gendered employment and industrial relations, different ap-
proaches to education, child-care practices, sanitation, housing and public 
health, and diverse forms of provision of social and maternity services (mu-
nicipal-collectivist in Burnley; philanthropic-paternalist in Kent; and largely 
                                                             
27  George Boyer (1990, ch. 5) has shown that those rural southern counties adopting the most 
generous form of family allowance outdoor relief under the Old Poor Law saw their birth 
rates increase the most, while Szreter and Garrett (2000, 52-8) have pointed out that the na-
tion’s overall birth rate declined as marriage become substantially more unpopular during 
the post-Napoleonic War decades, when the previous upward trend in Poor Law expendi-
ture was curtailed and then sharply cut after 1834 to approximately half its previous level. 
 85 
absent in the conservatively patriarchal and autarkic coal-mining community of 
Bishop Auckland) (Pooley 2009). 
In linking such localised differences in beliefs and ideologies to divergences 
in reproductive patterns McQuillan has clarified the crucially important con-
ceptual point that the independent role played by institutions needs to be care-
fully analysed and dissected. With his focus on the function of institutions 
McQuillan helpfully enables us to see culture, politics and ideology as distinc-
tive components, with institutions – of various kinds – acting as the socially 
mobilising vehicles which deliver these influences and monitor and enforce 
their power – with varying degrees of effectiveness. McQuillan persuasively 
shows that ideologies and culture each have the potential to cause dramatic 
differences in reproductive regimes, even between imbricated communication 
communities living in and among each other and enjoying essentially similar 
economic resources and choices, but only if they possess the institutions to 
enforce their ideological and cultural authority throughout their membership 
networks. This requires institutions to instill their teaching and to provide 
credible and feared sanctions against defaulters. This in turn depends on com-
mand of resources by such institutional enforcers of ideologies, which ulti-
mately derives from effective political strategies in relation to potential ideo-
logical competitors for the resources to support the institutions. This may well 
require the capacity to forge effective alliances outside the local community to 
access the superior resources required for enforcing local authority. As 
McQuillan shows, the Catholic Church in Quebec has often proved itself adept 
at playing the politics, not just locally but in relation to the Canadian national 
government, in such a way as to powerfully influence Catholic fertility in Que-
bec until at least the 1960s (McQuillan 2004). 
Furthermore, as Katherine Lynch acutely notes, the tendency of diverse 
Church authorities, as in Catholic Canada or Protestant England for instance, to 
mobilise a rhetoric of ‘traditional’ family values against birth control propa-
gandists should not necessarily be understood as unqualified enthusiasm for 
large families or unregulated fertility. It was also part of an institution-
defending reaction against the perceived challenges of the secular birth-control 
advocates of the early twentieth century. Call for traditional family values was 
directed less against the wisdom of moderate families per se and more against 
the secular birth controllers’ unwanted rocking of the boat. In seeking to place 
birth control and therefore also sexuality in the public domain, secularist birth 
controllers threatened the uneasy peace which the established churches in both 
these societies had established with great difficulty in order to both police, but 
also neutralise this most contentious area of human behaviour and morals, by 
adhering to the convention that sex was, above all, a private matter (Lynch 
2006, 34-9). Religious institutions defended tradition as a matter of privacy and 
preserving public silence in these affairs, not because they were against mod-
eration in marital fertility (as was shown for instance by the very moderate 
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family sizes of both Anglican and Nonconformist ministers in the 1911 census 
of Britain), but because they wished to preserve the customary privacy sur-
rounding these issues, which enabled religious agencies to maintain moral 
authority over their flock without having continually to tackle openly and head-
on these de-stabilising issues of personal and public sexual morality. 
6. Practical Implications: Priorities for 
Future Research on Fertility Declines  
What, then, don’t we know and what do we need to know about the process of 
fertility decline? I believe that collectively we know more than we think we do 
– but there is a considerable and genuine problem in bringing it all together in a 
helpful way. But apart from this issue of effective synthesis in a field so broad 
and deep, I should try to answer with some specific suggestions about priori-
ties, as I see them, for future research in the history of fertility declines, which 
follow from the above discussion of a heuristic framework for study. I will 
offer suggestions under five headings here: sex; religion; communication 
communities; health; education.  
Firstly, sex. There should be a very high priority among the international 
community of demographic historians to mount oral history projects in other 
European or North American countries to investigate the histories of sexuality, 
gender, power and marriage in those many diverse national contexts, before 
members of the older generations who lived through the periods of declining 
fertility, are no longer available for interview. For instance there are many 
European societies where fertility declines were so recent that many can still be 
interviewed from all cohorts during the process, such as Spain, the Netherlands, 
Bulgaria, Eire or Poland for instance. 
I would add that, having worked as part of a team with Kate Fisher on our 
oral history research project, I now have the greatest respect for the difficulties 
involved in working with oral history evidence to produce valid and interesting 
findings about the past. It is certainly not remotely an easy option for studying 
the recent past; however I am all the more convinced that it is an extraordinar-
ily valuable and important potential source, especially for this crucial subject of 
the relationship between sexuality and changing fertility. There are very few 
other comparable sources which can give the ordinary person’s views on this 
subject. In Britain we have the cache of interwar correspondence generated by 
Marie Stopes, which certainly is a valuable source to set beside the oral history 
testimony, but there is little else that is comparable. The sources created 
through public discourses of the period – the arts and literature, the processes 
of law and the medical profession – all tell rather different stories from those of 
ordinary people. Without oral history or something comparable like the Stopes 
letters, it is not possible to understand in detail the difference between the pub-
lic discourses – mainly reflecting preoccupations, practices and aspirations of 
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agenda-setting sections of the educated social elites – and the diversity of pri-
vate practices of the vast, conservative majority of the populace.  
Secondly, religion. The decline of religious sentiment and the rise of secu-
larism is a well-worn item in the modernisation canon, including among the 
proponents of the ‘second demographic transition’. However, recent historiog-
raphy on Britain indicates a much more complex story than one of smooth, 
gradual reduction of religiosity in step with falling fertility. Studies in British 
history have focused on the persistence and adaptation of religious frameworks 
of thought in relation to gender relations within the family and models of child-
rearing throughout the era of declining fertility, including a notable religious 
revival in association with social conservatism in British society as recently as 
the late 1940s and 1950s, in a very low-fertility context.28 Many factors seem to 
have been involved in the subsequent rapid fall-off in religious participation 
rates from the 1960s, including post-war full employment, rising affluence, 
social security and welfare replacing the need for some of the support functions 
previously provided by religious organisations to the poor, and the dramatic 
changes in gender relations and expanding female choices, in relation to both 
sexuality and employment during the 1960s and 1970s (cf. Davie 1994; 
McLeod 2007; Brown 2009). Furthermore, politics and institutions are all 
involved in this story of changing religious dispositions – it’s not just about 
autonomic changes in ideology and culture. McQuillan and Praz’s exemplary 
work has been mentioned and there is also the excellent recent volume of case 
studies edited by Derosas and van Poppel (2006). 
Thirdly, and to some extent another dimension of research on the religious 
dimension, the general approach suggested here of identifying ‘communication 
communities’ which have distinctive child-rearing patterns could probably be 
helpfully brought into articulation with the research inspired by Goldscheider’s 
(1971) pioneering work on the fertility of minorities and immigrants. The con-
cept of communication communities and the way that it envisages that its par-
ticipants may moderate their fertility in response to observation of the family 
size patterns of others around them sharing the same values, concerns and 
constraints, could benefit from the kind of geographical and network analysis 
used by Derosas on Jews and Gentiles in Venice to examines issues of relative 
sizes and preponderance of these different communication communities in 
different sections of the city and the extent to which their relationships were 
exclusive of each other (Desrosas 2006). In England some communication 
communities can be identified in 1911 which were quite geographically domi-
nant and separated from others; but where they shared space, as in Venice or 
                                                             
28  On the strength of the post-war decade of Christian religious revival, c.1945-55, see Brown 
(2009, 170-5, 212-15; Harris 155-81). On the increased popularity of a socially conserva-
tive form of marriage, see Finch and Summerfield (1991, 7-32); and on renewed emphasis 
on domesticated maternal roles, see Riley (1983). 
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Ulster for instance, whether their different ideologies and cultures result in 
differential fertility patterns will depend on the extent to which their respective 
religious authorities have the institutions and resources to maintain social and 
economic differences among them, as McQuillan and Praz show. Issues such as 
these in fertility research, in turn, also relate to the new interests of ‘world 
history’ researchers, who have revitalised migration studies with their focus on 
the social identities and resources of inter-continental networks and diasporas, 
although rigorous study of the demography of such groups will certainly re-
main technically challenging.29 
Fourthly, the general subject of the relationship between fertility and health 
and disease remains under-examined, especially as this relates to issues of 
culture and ideology. Part of the divergent fertility patterns of different com-
munication communities may be related to distinctive health or disease patterns 
due to cultural or employment-related conditions. Certainly the unusual low 
fertility and child mortality of Jewish minorities, even when living in difficult 
urban conditions, has been a well-attested finding in the literature (Marks 
1994). While the important general association between aspects of poverty and 
poor housing and infant mortality has been clearly demonstrated, the Jewish 
anomaly indicates that considerably more could be done to refine our under-
standing of the relationship between fertility, health and disease and culture. 
One way in which such work has developed has been in relation to gendered 
ideologies in regions of India and China and their influence on sex-differential 
survivorship of the young and maternal mortality. In some Asian societies, the 
high relative costs of girls have long been reflected in ‘post-natal’ abortion 
methods – infanticide or neglect. In an Asian cultural dispensation, mortality 
rates are therefore just as significant as fertility rates in helping us to under-
standing the cost-benefit calculus of parents. As Kishor (1993) has shown, 
gender mortality differentials in India are particularly pronounced in areas 
where women have both low economic and, more importantly, low cultural 
value. Generally speaking, North Indian mortality differentials are pronounced 
because of the confluence of low cultural and economic worth. In the North, 
mechanized agricultural production has led to the exclusion of female labour. 
Together with higher-than-the-norm dowry rates, this makes the relative eco-
nomic value of girls extremely low. The North is also more patriarchal than the 
South, further depressing the overall value of girls via the cultural account. In 
the South, there is relative equality of mortality partly because the labour inten-
sive rice industry is dependent on female labour. There are also resilient matri-
archal traditions in the South, particularly in Kerala state. In short, women in 
the North get the worse of both worlds, while women in some areas in the 
South get (relatively) ‘the best’ of both worlds. The significance of long-lasting 
                                                             
29  For a leading exponent of this, see McKeown (1999; 2004; 2008). For an introductory text, 
see Cohen (1997). 
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geographical influences is also indicated here in that such gender discrimina-
tion against female infant survivorship seems to be markedly absent throughout 
most of sub-Saharan Africa, a region with poverty to match parts of India. As a 
gross generalisation it can be said that Africa has been characterised as gener-
ally exhibiting a much more pronounced ‘pro-reproduction’ set of cultural 
beliefs due to a long-standing perceived labour shortage in this vast, sparsely 
populated continent (Caldwell and Caldwell 1987; Iliffe 2007). 
More generally the issue of diseases and the general health burden and their 
relationship with fertility (both physiological and medical effects and perhaps 
via coital frequency) require much more research and this typically involves 
issues of gender, power, ethnicity and sexuality.30 Demographic historians have 
moved into the difficult area of analysing stillbirth rates (Woods 2009); and we 
have the impressive British and comparative work of Irvine Loudon on mater-
nal health and the dangers of childbirth (Loudon 1992; 2000). There has also 
been much work on the clandestine area of abortion and abortifacients in Brit-
ain (and elsewhere) during the era of the fertility decline (e.g. Sauer 1978; 
Brookes 1988; Fisher 1999; McIntosh 2000; Moore 2008, ch. 6). These are all 
important areas of research on the interface between reproduction, fertility, 
disease and health, where further research will be of great value. Sexual health 
and sexually transmitted diseases is probably the most conspicuously under-
researched area in the demographic history of fertility declines. Demographers 
and epidemiologists have of course given very considerable attention recently 
to these problems in relation to HIV-AIDS, chancroid and chlamydia and their 
possible interactions with fertility, with many studies especially in sub-Saharan 
Africa.31 To my knowledge there has been almost no evaluation of the possible 
historic influence of the venereal diseases, as they were called before the 
1990s, on fertility variation during the era of national falls in fertility.32 
Finally, education. Here, there is the widely-reiterated female education the-
sis: that nothing brings down fertility more consistently than universal female 
education. While I’m sure this is not incorrect in its general thrust, there does 
need to be more discerning research on this. As Praz shows in her study of the 
highly gendered differences between Catholic and Protestant communities in 
early twentieth century Switzerland, the effects of education expansion can be 
diverse in relation to fertility. Jennifer Johnson-Hanks also produces many 
                                                             
30  See the recent research on Indian fertility and health reported in Borooah et al (2010); and 
more generally Iyer (2002). See also the attempt by Beier (2008) to relate these two themes 
in her secondary analysis of oral history sources. 
31  This socio-medical literature is enormous; see above for some references. For an influential 
early contribution from a scholar who has also contributed to the demographic history of 
fertility decline, see Caldwell and Caldwell (1996). 
32  My own current researches include a Wellcome-funded research project to explore histori-
cal sources of evidence to examine the possible relationship between venereal diseases and 
changing fertility in British history during the period 1860-1940, see above. 
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complex and interesting findings of a far from straightforward relationship 
between the acquisition of more advanced education and fertility and birth 
control practices among Cameroonian young women (Praz 2005; Johnson-
Hanks 2006). We have found important distinctions in the gendered culture and 
practice of contraception in twentieth Britain, depending on whether either 
member of the married couple had experienced secondary education (although 
primary school attendance was universal, completion of secondary schooling 
was confined to just 7% of those aged 15-18 in England and Wales as recently 
as just before World War II) (Szreter and Fisher 2010, 22-3 and ch. 6). It is in 
fact a strong contemporary policy implication of these detailed oral history 
findings that ‘in a society where there is no well-developed public discourse of 
sex (as in pre-1960s Britain and such as in many African and in many Islamic 
societies), there may be a crucial difference between providing girls only with 
elementary education (as the English working-class had before 1944 and as in 
much of sub-Saharan Africa and India today) and providing secondary educa-
tion for all. In England it was only middle-class women with secondary educa-
tion who had the confidence to negotiate with their husbands and even, where 
necessary, to take control of contraception in their marriages (Szreter and 
Fisher 2010b). Sian Pooley’s local comparative study has found complex rela-
tionships between differences in local educational provision, opportunities for 
children’s social mobility and parental aspirations and child-rearing practices in 
the three very different communities she studied: a mining district (Bishop 
Auckland, County Durham), a textiles town where the Social Democratic Fed-
eration had strong support (Burnley, Lancashire), and a middle-class commuter 
suburb of London (Bromley in Kent) (Pooley 2009, chs. 2, 6). 
7. Conclusion 
To study fertility declines comparatively with the assistance of a general 
framework, we must construct a framework that can acknowledge and incorpo-
rate the fact that fertility declines almost always happened in the context of 
political conflict over ideas and beliefs about reproduction, in both local com-
munication communities and in national and transnational discourses, with 
culture and institutions mobilised through ideologies as the weapons for usually 
peaceful but nevertheless intense and emotionally charged negotiation, chal-
lenge and defence. This really should not be in the least surprising. After all 
most episodes of dramatic national fertility change, including secular fertility 
declines, have occurred during periods when the encompassing national socie-
ties and their economies have also gone through dramatic changes in their 
respective configuration – the set of economic and social transformations we 
broadly describe as industrialisation and urbanisation. No observant commenta-
tors on societies undergoing such changes, from Disraeli and Engels onwards – 
to name two politically diametrically opposed such contemporary observers in 
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England for instance – have ever seriously suggested that these processes of 
economic and social transformation are anything but profoundly disruptive for 
the majority of the persons involved. All the fundamental values, beliefs and 
institutions are shaken to their core as the family, the market, and the state are 
all reconstructed in their mutual relationships and this typically ensues in sig-
nificant political debate and engagement (Szreter 1997). Fertility declines can-
not be studied comparatively through a general narrative or framework which 
simply ignores this and which does not have a central place for the contingent 
unpredictability of politics and for the forms of social and ideological competi-
tion and division that occur. The fundamental premise for the approach pro-
posed here, that of multiple fertility declines, acknowledges the necessity of 
this open-ended framework. 
This does not mean that social science methods, quantification and rigorous 
hypothesis testing, through for instance multiple regression, multi-level model-
ling or other forms of mathematical representation of relationships, are any the 
less useful – and sometimes crucial – in our studies of fertility declines.33 But it 
does mean that they are never going to give us final answers or truly compre-
hensive understandings of the history of changes in procreative behaviour. This 
will not trouble the more sophisticated users of these techniques, who would 
never have dreamed this was their purpose. The study of fertility change al-
ways starts with adept and critical statistical reconstructions of the demo-
graphic evidence. On the fortunate occasions where relevant information can 
be rendered into the appropriate form for the statistical methodology to be 
extended to mount careful evaluations of certain kinds of causation this is to be 
welcomed wholeheartedly. However, to attempt to approach a full understand-
ing of fertility declines among specific communication communities, as are 
typically found in national populations, the results of such rigorous studies will 
always have to be combined and integrated also with the interpretative han-
dling of other more qualitative evidence relating to ideals, ideas, beliefs, insti-
tutions, politics, policies and such highly subjective material as reported per-
ceptions, attitudes and emotions.  
I would conclude then, in responding to the challenge set by Mikołaj 
Szołtysek’s article, that the study of fertility decline is currently not so much in 
crisis as pregnant with great promise. Historical demography will always be at 
the core of the subject but any claims to disciplinary exclusivity should be 
relinquished. The study of reproductive variation in history is an expanding 
universe of research questions and methodologies. For this we need not a uni-
                                                             
33  For instance George Alter’s (2010) most recent innovative proposals for a statistical tech-
nique for discriminating between different possible patterns of reduced fertility in marriage 
(which have previously been discussed as ‘stopping’, ‘spacing’ and ‘starting’) offers a most 
interesting technical development for demographic historians to exploit where they have 
appropriate quantitative sources. 
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versal theory to test but a fruitful heuristic framework to enable us to see the 
relationships between our necessarily diverse findings and participate in an 
expansive multi-disciplinary dialogue. Researchers should certainly be reflex-
ively aware of, but not necessarily overly concerned about epistemological 
differences related to the diverse methodologies required for researching very 
different forms of evidence. It requires only goodwill, intellectual humility and 
generosity, and capacities for synthesis to combine these kinds of knowledge 
productively. It can be no surprise that the study of fertility declines make such 
diverse intellectual demands upon its researchers, given that the subject of 
enquiry – historical change in human reproduction – is one of the most com-
plex, variable and multi-faceted problems we could ever set ourselves to try to 
understand. 
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